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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
ARTHUR ANTHONY GONZALES, : Case No. 20020935-SC 
Defendant/Appellant, : 
INTRODUCTION 
Mr. Gonzales files this reply to correct the State's and amicus curiae's erroneous 
characterizations of the record and constructions of the law.1 The briefs, like Judge 
McCleve's decision below, erroneously attribute sinister motives to the defense and 
misrepresent the source and quality of Jessica's psychosis, antisocial behavior, 
depression, paranoia, and hatred of Mr. Gonzales. The State and NCVLI provide no 
authoritative support for the creation of a constitutional right to notice and a hearing 
whenever criminal defendants subpoena complainants' treatment records. The State also 
raises several unfounded instances in which the defense purportedly failed to preserve 
arguments for appeal. If anything, the State waived the admissibility of Jessica's 
allegations of prior sexual misconduct. The record demonstrates that the trial court 
lThis brief hereinafter refers to amicus curiae as the National Crime Victim Law 
Institute ("NCVLI") and to NCVLFs Brief as "ACB." Appellant's Brief is referred to as 
("AB") and the State's brief is noted as "SB." 
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I 
deprived Mr. Gonzales of his rights to in camera review of the treatment records, choose 
his counsel, cross-examine witnesses, and the effective assistance of counsel. These i 
errors, individually and cumulatively, deprived Mr. Gonzales of his right to a fair trial. 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DEPRIVED MR. GONZALES OF 
HIS RIGHTS TO IN CAMERA REVIEW AND COUNSEL * 
OF HIS CHOICE IN MISCONSTRUING THE LAW AND 
FACTS ON SUBPOENAING TREATMENT RECORDS. 
Contrary to the State's and NCVLI's portrayal of the evidence and the law, I 
defense counsel followed this Court's prescribed procedures and acted in good faith in 
obtaining Jessica's psychological records. Neither the State nor NCVLI presents any 
i 
persuasive authority for creating a constitutional right to notice and a hearing for 
subpoenaed psychological records. No constitutional right is needed because existing 
procedures folly-equip trial judges to address disputes over subpoenaed psychological 
records. Moreover, the defense established a reasonable likelihood that the records 
contained exculpatory evidence that Jessica fabricated the allegations given her serious * 
psychological disorders and propensity to lie. Judge McCleve's unfounded suspicion of 
defense counsel amd misapplication of the law deprived Mr. Gonzales of his 
4 
constitutional right to maintain his relationship with appointed counsel. 
A, Defense Counsel Followed Applicable Law 
and Acted in Good Faith in the Absence of 
Legal Precedent 
Like Judge McCleve below, the State and NCVLI misapprehend the facts and the 
law surrounding the subpoena for Jessica's psychological records. Instead, defense ^ 
2 
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counsel followed the prescribed procedures for subpoenaing treatment records, including 
correctly representing that Jessica's mental state was at issue. When counsel 
unexpectedly received the records without a motion to quash, he responsibly safeguarded 
them knowing that the trial judge would decide how to proceed. In sum, Judge 
McCleve misconstrued defense counsel's actions as deceptive. 
1. The Record and Existing Law 
Support Defense Counsel's 
Efforts in Subpoenaing and 
Obtaining the Treatment 
Records 
Defense counsel subpoenaed the treatment records in direct compliance with this 
Court's instructions in State v. Pliego. 1999 UT 8, 974 P.2d 279. At the outset, NCVLI 
incorrectly describes Mr. Gonzales' claim as Pliego somehow mandating criminal 
defendants to subpoena witness psychological records. ACB at 18 n.7. Instead, he 
simply posits that he followed the procedures detailed in Pliego to subpoena third-party 
records directly from record holders rather than the State. IdL at f^20. 
The State and NCVLI further mistakenly fault defense counsel's actions even 
though neither Pliego nor any other provision of Utah law address a record holder's 
inadvertent disclosure of privileged information. In the absence of any law, defense 
counsel acted in good faith and complied with existing law. Contrary to the fraudulent 
motives that the State and NCVLI attribute to defense counsel, defense counsel complied 
with Pliego and the prosecutor's own instructions "to request th[e] records directly from 
3 
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4 
the provider." R. 211. The prosecutor never requested or even implied that she expected 
defense counsel to notify her of the subpoenas. Rather, she stated her intention to seek to ' 
quash the subpoenas in the trial court after defense counsel had subpoenaed any records. 
Id. The State's complaints about its lack of notice are duplicitous given counsel's
 g 
adherence to the law and the prosecutor's own representations. 
As opposed to the State's speculation that defense counsel intentionally 
4 
circumvented the law, counsel relied on regular judicial procedures to resolve any 
disputes over subpoenas. When defense counsel issued the subpoena, he "anticipated a 
motion to quash in response to the subpoena rather than [receiving] the records ^ 
themselves." R. 259. In the absence of any law, defense reasonably relied on the State's 
plan to quash the subpoenas. The trial judge would then intervene and instruct the 
parties how to proceed. Defense counsel's actions after receiving the records support 
that counsel relied on the trial court to instruct him absent existing law. When counsel 
I 
learned of UUNI's mistake, he informed counsel for UUNI that he would safeguard the 
records because he didn't "want to have anything that's beyond pale." R. 460: 20. 
Sound policy supports defense counsel's good faith actions. "Lawyers, as ^ 
attorneys and counselors at law, are officers of the courts of this state and take a special 
oath subjecting them to the Rules of Professional Conduct promulgated by the Utah 
Supreme Court." Applied Med. Tech. v. Eames. 2002 UT 18,TJ20,44 P.3d 699. 
Accordingly, this Court hesitates to infer attorney misconduct when "there is no 
I 
4 
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evidence, nor any reason to presume" that counsel acted with an unethical or improper 
"motive." State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, ^ |92, 63 P.3d 731. Because no evidence 
supports that defense counsel had any improper motives, the State merely speculates on 
appeal that counsel intentionally skirted the law to obtain the treatment records. 
2. Defense Counsel Correctly 
Represented that Jessica's 
Mental State was at Issue 
Similarly, defense counsel accurately informed UUNI that Jessica's mental or 
emotional condition were at issue. R. 170. This Court has unequivocally ruled that 
under Rule of Evidence 506 "no privilege exists where 'a communication relevant to an 
issue of the physical, mental, or emotional condition of the patient in any proceeding in 
which that condition is an element of any claim or defense.'" State v. Cardall, 1999 UT 
51, TJ29, 982 P.2d 79; see also State v.Blake. 2002 UT 113, [^18, 63 P.3d 56 (applying 
this exception to sexual abuse of a minor); Debrv v. Goates, 2000 UT App 58, f24, 999 
P.2d 582 ("this exception applies when any party raises the mental condition of a patient 
in a proceeding."). Because this undisputed law placed Jessica's mental condition at 
issue, defense counsel correctly represented that this case raised Jessica's emotional state. 
Despite these clear directives, the State and NCVLI complain that Jessica's mental 
condition was not "an element of any claim or defense." SB at 30-31; ACB at 37-40. 
(both quoting Utah R. Evid. 506 (d)(1)). To the contrary, defense counsel articulated 
three defense theories based on Jessica's mental state. First, he asserted that Jessica had 
5 
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"fabricated this story because, given her emotional state, she simply couldn't stand the 
idea of having [Mr. Gonzales] governing her life and her mother's life." R. 460: 13,15. * 
Second, Jessica's habitual lying and anti-social behavior, including her prior false 
allegation, directly undermined her accusations. IcL_atl8. Third, Jessica's 
"psychological state is such that she cannot interpret or perceive information adequately." 
IdL at 17-18. 
i 
The State and NCVLI counter that defenses must be defined by statute. SB at 23; 
ACB at 45. This argument leads to the "absurd" conclusion that because Utah law does 
not list fabrication or mental illness as statutory defenses, defendants cannot raise those i 
issues at trial. State v. Carruth. 1999 UT 107, |22, 993 P.2d 869. "Fundamental due 
process requires that a defendant in a criminal proceeding be allowed to present his or 
her theory of defense to the jury. A district court's exclusion of evidence that is an 
integral part of the defendant's theory of defense violates due process of law." State v. 
4 
Bourassa, 15 P.3d 835, 841 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999). 
Neither the State nor NCVLI cite any authority for limiting defenses to statutory 
definitions. Directly contrary to their assertion, this Court recognized identical defenses i 
in Cardall. Specifically, Cardall claimed that the complainant was "a habitual liar", had 
"fabricated her story about being raped," and that "these psychological traits led her to lie 
. . . . " 1999 UT 51, Tf29, 982 P.2d 79. Mr. Gonzales' defenses here are indistinguishable. 
Because defense counsel properly relied on Jessica's mental state, Judge McCleve 
i 
6 
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clearly erred in finding that counsel acted deceptively. State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, 
TJ17 n.2, 1 P.3d 1108. Despite the State's contentions, Mr. Gonzales marshaled the 
pertinent evidence on appeal, including the communications between counsel about 
subpoenas, the trial court's instructions not to contact Jessica, and the details surrounding 
defense counsel's subpoena and affidavit to UUNI. AB at 25-26. He then explained that 
defense counsel correctly followed Pliego and otherwise acted reasonably in the absence 
of law on the mistaken disclosure of treatment records. Id. at 25-27. Finally, Mr. 
Gonzales detailed Judge McCleve's misunderstanding of defense counsel's actions and 
the law and further showed that defense counsel properly obtained and then safeguarded 
the psychological records. IcL at 23-27. These facts establish that Judge McCleve clearly 
erred. State v. Benvenuto. 1999 UT 60, ^fl3, 983 P.2d 556. 
3. NCVLFs Additional Arguments Lack 
Merit 
NCVLFs remaining attacks on defense counsel equally lack merit. First, 
discovery is not limited to the matters listed in Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 16. 
ACB at 43-45. Rule 14 specifically authorizes the use of subpoenas "to produce in court 
or to allow inspection of records, papers, or other objects." Utah R. Crim. P. 14(b). 
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has explicitly rejected NCVLFs position in 
holding that "any document or other materials, admissible as evidence, obtained by the 
Government by solicitation or voluntarily from third parties is subject to subpoena." 
Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 214, 221 (1951). Consistent with this 
7 
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ruling, this Court has repeatedly authorized criminal defendants' subpoenaing treatment 
records from third-party record holders. CardalK 1999 UT 8, f 20, 974 P.2d 279; Blake, l 
2002 UT 113, Tfl9. 63 P.3d 56; State v. Hansen. 2002 UT 114. ^ 6. 61 P.3d 1062. 
Clearly, subpoenas are well-accepted in criminal cases.
 g 
Second, NCVLI miscontrues Doe v. Maret, 1999 UT 74, f l 1, 984 P.2d 980. 
ACB at 35. That case notes in passing that a privilege results when the privilege holder 
i 
"intended [the communications] to be confidential at the time they were made." IcL That 
case then assesses whether a privilege holder has waived a privilege under Rule of 
Evidence 507. IdL at ^f 12-20. That case, in no way, holds that exceptions to privileges ^ 
do not apply if the holder intended to keep communications private when they were 
made. Rather, this Court's discussion of waiver and listing of exceptions to the privilege 
at issue confirms that a person can lose the protection of a privilege by the subsequent 
occurrence of one of the listed exceptions. IcL at ^}8-20. 
i 
B. Complainants Have No Right to Notice or a 
Hearing When Others Subpoena Their 
Psychological Records. 
Utah law does not require criminal defendants to give notice when subpoenaing ^ 
witnesses' psychological records. Further, neither the State nor NCVLI provide any 
authority for creating a due process or privacy right to notice and hearing. The Victims' 
Rights Amendment to the Utah Constitution similarly extends no such right to 
complainants. 
i 
8 
4 
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1. The Applicable Rules of 
Criminal Procedure Do Not 
Require Notice 
Despite conceding that the subpoena process under Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure does not require notice, the State invokes the Rules of Civil Procedure 
because it contends that Rule of Criminal Procedure 14 is "silent" on notice. SB at 24. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 81(e) applies the civil rules to "criminal proceedings where 
there is no other applicable statute or rule. . . ." Rule of Civil Procedure 45(b)(1)(A) 
requires parties to notify the opposing party of subpoenas. 
This reasoning ignores that Rule of Criminal Procedure 14 is an "applicable" rule 
that "specifically" governs subpoenas in criminal cases. Utah R. Civ. P. 81(e); Utah R. 
Crim. P. 31(2). That rule specifically defines parties' duties in subpoenaing documents 
or witnesses in criminal cases. Rule 1(c) further mandates that the Rules of Criminal 
Procedure "shall govern all criminal proceedings...." Utah R. Crim. P. 1(c). Thus, 
when a court rule or statute specifies the procedure in criminal cases, "Rule 81(e) [is] 
inapplicable and [] the Rules of Civil Procedure pertaining to discovery may not be used 
in criminal cases." State v. Nielsen. 522 P.2d 1366, 1367 (Utah 1974). Because Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 14 "govern[s] all criminal proceedings," defendants need not provide 
notice of subpoenas to third parties or the State. Utah R. Crim. P. 1(c). 
The NCVLI further misconstrues Mr. Gonzales' arguments as "affirmatively 
requiring" criminal defendants not to provide notice. ACB at 18. Rather, Mr. Gonzales 
9 
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argues that because Rule 14 specifically addresses subpoenas and includes no notice 
provision, he had no duty to give notice of the subpoena. AB at 23. In apparent * 
agreement, this Court has not required notice in criminal cases. 
2. Defense Counsel Overlooked the 
Clause in the Affidavit to UUNI * 
Concerning Notice 
Similarly unfounded are the State's and NCVLI's accusations that defense counsel 
( 
intentionally misrepresented in his affidavit to UUNI that he would notify the State of the 
UUNI subpoena. SB at 25, 29-30; ACB at 18 n.6. The context surrounding the 
subpoena and affidavit, at most, show inadvertence. Pages three and four of the I 
subpoena extensively detail record holders5 rights to oppose subpoenas and to invoke 
privileges. R. 168-69. Rather than showing deception, these disclosures support 
counsel's commitment to follow the law. Because the State never raised this argument 
below, the record does not address the affidavit's notice clause. But, given the 
i 
presumption that counsel act ethically, this Court should attribute innocent motives to 
defense counsel. Arguelles. 2003 UT 1,1J92, 63 P.3d 731; Eames., 2002 UT 18, f20, 44 
P.3d699. Specifically, because defense counsel simply filled out a form affidavit i 
prepared by UUNI, believing that he had accurately represented the situation, his failure 
to provide notice was more likely an innocent omission as opposed to wilful misconduct. 
Consistent with this view, defense counsel may not have had an opportunity to 
provide notice because UUNI informed him of its mistaken disclosure "shortly after11 he 
i 
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received the treatment records. R. 460: 20. When counsel learned of UNNFs mistake, 
notice was no longer needed because UNNI planned to seek to quash the subpoena and 
to notify the State in the process. In the absence of "any reason to presume" that counsel 
acted with an unethical or improper "motive," this Court should not fault defense counsel 
for the lack of notice. ArgueUes, 2003 UT 1,1J92, 63 P.3d 731. 
3. No Due Process Principles 
Support Requiring Criminal 
Defendants to Provide Notice of 
Subpoenas to Third Parties 
NCVLI alternatively asks this Court to create a due process right for complainants 
to receive notice and a hearing when their psychological records are subpoenaed. ACB 
at 5-21. But, NCVLI identifies no authorities establishing a due process right to notice 
and a hearing when criminal defendants subpoena complainants' treatment records. The 
cases the State cites address clearly established liberty and property interests such as 
employment rights, government entitlements such as social security, incarceration, and 
access to public information. See, e.g., Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) 
(social security benefits); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare benefits); 
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (transferring a prisoner to a psychiatric hospital). 
But, none of those cases even remotely address a similar constitutionally-protected 
interest in treatment records. Even the principal case NCVLI identifies is readily 
distinguishable because it involved the life and death situation of disclosing undercover 
police officers' identities. Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1059 (6 th Cir. 
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1998). 
Rule of Evidence 506 also gives no support to a due process right. That rule does * 
not create a legal entitlement but, rather, establishes a conditional privilege that may not 
apply in certain excluded situations, such as here, when a witness's mental condition is at . 
issue. Cardalh 1999 UT 51, TJ29, 982 P.2d 79 (quoting Utah R. Evid. 506(1 )(b)). 
Likewise, the federal cases that have found a right to privacy in certain psychological 
i 
records only provide a conditional right that "must often give way to considerations of 
public interest." Daurv v. Smith. 842 F.2d 9, 13 (1st Cir. 1988). 
These cases also fail to support NCVLI's request to create a privacy right to I 
notice and a hearing. This Court concluded in Blake that "the right to a fair trial must be 
preserved" over privacy interests. 2002 UT 113, [^10, 63 P.3d 56. The cases NCVLI 
cites offers little help in balancing defendants' and victims' rights because they do not 
address criminal defendants' right to a fair trial. Those cases simply beg the question of 
4 
when does privacy "give way" in criminal cases. Daury, 842 F.2d at 13. Moreover, the 
only reported case that appellate counsel could find that addresses a privacy right to 
notice and hearing rejected such a right. Commonwealth v. Pelligrini. 608 N.E.2d 717, 4 
718-21 (Mass. 1993) (right to privacy does not allow a mother to withhold her newborn 
baby's hospital records showing illegal drugs in the baby's body). 
Although this Court has defined a general right to privacy, it has no application 
here. In Redding v. Brady, 606 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1980), this Court relied on statutes 
i 
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requiring disclosure of public information and the constitutional rights to free speech, 
assembly, and the press to rule that the public's interest in government employees' 
salaries overrides a general right to keep one's income private. IcL_ at 1195-97. This 
Court has not extended Redding beyond access to public records or ensuring the public's 
right to governmental oversight. If anything, Redding's rejection of government 
employees' claim to a right keep their salaries private undermines NCVLI's claims. 
Other concepts of privacy are equally unavailing. Due process provides for a 
privacy right to "personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, 
family relationships, child rearing, and education." Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 
2581 (2003). NCVLI's citations to this line of cases is inapposite. 
If anything, Utah law undermines an alleged victim's right to privacy in criminal 
cases. In Blake, this Court ruled that "the right to a fair trial must be preserved" over 
privacy concerns. 2002 UT 113, J^10, 63 P.3d 56. Likewise, the Utah Court of Appeals 
has observed, "In a criminal context, such as Cardall and Ritchie, due process concerns 
limit the extent of an evidentiary privilege because a criminal defendant has a 
constitutional right to a fair trial." Debrv. 2000 UT App 58, f27, 999 P.2d 582. 
"Fundamental due process requires that a defendant in a criminal proceeding be allowed 
to present his or her theory of defense to the jury." Bourassa, 15 P.3d at 841. Thus, 
privacy interests do not "alter the fundamental principles on which our legal system is 
based." People v. Nestrock. 735 N.E.2d 1101, 1109 (111. App. Ct. 2000). 
13 
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4. The Victims9 Rights Amendment 
to the Utah Constitution 
Contains No Express or Implied ^ 
Support For Creating A 
Constitutional Right to Notice 
and a Hearing 
NCVLI similarly fails to support creating a constitutional right to notice and a 
hearing under the Victims' Rights Amendment ("VRA") to the Utah Constitution. Utah 
Const, art. I, §28 (Supp. 2003); ACB at 21-32. Because the VRA fails to require any < 
specific procedures, NCVLI requests this Court to fashion "unarticulated rights." ACB 
Brief at 22. NCVLI relies on subsection (l)(a) of the VRA, which provides crime 
i 
victims the right ,f[t]o be treated with fairness, respect, and dignity, and to be free from 
harassment and abuse throughout the criminal justice process." Id_ at §(l)(a). NCVLI 
asks this Court to take an enormous leap of logic to construe the rights to fairness and 
freedom from abuse as requiring notice and a hearing whenever a criminal defendant 
subpoenas a complainant's treatment records. 4 
Again, NCVLI cites no supporting authority for fairness to victims requiring a 
constitutional right to notice and a hearing. Courts that have construed statutory or 
i 
constitutional victims' rights provisions have concluded that the right to a fair trial 
prevails over privacy concerns and that these provisions do not "alter the fundamental 
principles on which our legal system is based." Nestrock, 735 N.E.2d at 1109; see. Hult 
v. Romlev. 987 P.2d 218, 222 (Ariz. 1999); Benton v. Superior Court. 897 P.2d 1352, 
1354 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994). Likewise, this Court specifically held in Blake that fair trial < 
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rights prevail when resolving tensions between victims and criminal defendants under 
the VRA. 2002 UT 113,^jl0, 63 P.3d 56. 
In any event, NCVLI appears to overstate its concerns for abuse. By establishing 
an exception for a person's mental state under Rule of Evidence 506, the legislature 
purposefully provided complainants less protection in keeping their records private. This 
policy determination expresses a reduced concern for abuse when, as here, a defense or 
claim depends on the complainant's mental state. In addition, as "officers of the court11 
defense attorneys can be expected to use witness psychological information ethically and 
within the bounds of the law. Eames, 2002 UT 18, ^ [20, 44 P.3d 699. 
5. Existing Procedures Fully 
Protect Privacy Interests in 
Treatment Records 
This Court need not create a constitutional right to notice and a hearing because 
existing remedies adequately protect privacy interests. NCVLI lists a parade of horribles 
absent a right to privacy over psychological records, including chilling patients' 
willingness to confide in professionals and discouraging the reporting of crimes. ACB 
brief at 10-12. These fears are unfounded because this Court has already weighed these 
concerns when it established the in camera review procedure in Cardall. According to 
this Court, Cardall "represents a satisfactory method of balancing the interests of privacy 
and full reporting of crime with defendants1 ability to present the best case at trial." 
Blake. 2002 UT 113, f23, 63 P.3d 56. 
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Given this balancing of interests, this Court should not resort to creating an 
unnecessary due process right. As this Court held in Blake, this Court seeks nto avoid ^ 
constitutional interpretation where possible. . . ." Id. at ^16 (quoting Preuss v. 
Wilkerson. 858 P.2d 1362, 1362-63 (Utah 1993)). The VRA's general references to 
respectfully treating alleged victims adds little, if anything, to the due process equation. 
In fact, because the in camera review process accommodates privacy concerns, the VRA 
i 
is not needed to protect NCVLPs concern for fairness and abuse. 
Although Cardall does not address mistakenly released treatment records, the 
proceedings below demonstrate that trial courts can adequately address wrongful < 
disclosures. Trial courts learn of mistakenly released records from the record holder, the 
State, or the patient. Although Judge McCleve erroneously penalized the defense below, 
this case shows that if the defense misuses treatment records or wrongfully obtains them, 
judges can exclude evidence from trial or otherwise sanction the defense. 
Despite the State's and NCVLI's protestations, the mere receipt of treatment 
records is insufficient, in itself, to warrant sanctions. This conclusion is particularly 
applicable here given defense counsel's good faith efforts in the absence of law on the i 
wrongful disclosure of treatment records. Once UUNI informed counsel that it had 
mistakenly released the records and would seek to quash the subpoena, counsel 
responsibly secured the records until the trial judge could decide their use. R. 460: 17. 
Further, because defense already knew of Jessica's mental condition, except for the 
i 
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hallucinations, the seriousness of the breach of privacy was minimal. State ex. rel. v. 
Sanders, 575 S.E.2d 864, 871 (W.V. 2002). In any event, Judge McCleve could have 
adequately dealt with this disclosure by prohibiting the use of the hallucinations in the 
defense request for in camera review or at trial. 
The arguments for creating constitutional rights also divert this Court's attention 
from the actual source of the problem in this case: UUNPs failure to secure privileged 
information. The Utah Court of Appeals has established that doctors and therapists have 
a duty to "protect the confidentiality of [] patients." Debrv, 2000 UT App 58,1J28, 999 
P.2d 582. This duty includes providing patients notice before disclosing confidential 
records. Id "Such notice ensures that the patient can pursue the appropriate procedural 
safeguards in court to avoid unnecessary disclosure." IdL_ Through civil actions and the 
threat of damages, patients can assert their privacy rights as well as deter the wrongful 
release of information. See Stien v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc., 944 P.2d 374, 377 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997). Responsibility for the mistaken release of Jessica's treatment 
records lies with UUNI, not defense counsel and his efforts to follow the law. 
6. Should This Court Create a 
Constitutional Right to Notice 
and A Hearing, That Right Does 
Not Apply in This Case 
Even if this Court were to create a due process right to notice and a hearing, this 
Court should only apply that right prospectively. This Court is "reluctant to give [] 
retroactive effect" to its decisions when it has "adopted a new rule that is of a 
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constitutional dimension." State v. Gordon. 913 P.2d 350, 354 (Utah 1996). This Court 
applies new rights prospectively when the rule is "prophylactic" in seeking to prevent ' 
"recurrence" of a problem. Labrum v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 913-14 
(Utah 1993); State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 853 (Utah 1992). Likewise, establishing a 
"substantive" constitutional right to notice and a hearing favors prospective application. 
Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 45 (1990). Retroactive application risks creating a 
i 
"'substantial injustice'" by unfairly penalizing Mr. Gonzales in the absence of established 
law on wrongful disclosures. State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, ^ [53, 992 P.2d 951 (quoting 
Heslop v. Bank of Utah. 839 P.2d 828. 835 (Utah 1992)). i 
C. The Defense Established a Reasonable 
Likelihood That Jessica's Treatment Records 
Contained Exculpatory Evidence 
Judge McCleve further erred in incorrectly concluding that defense counsel learned 
of Jessica's mental disorders through the UUNI records. R. 262. The record establishes 
I 
that Mr. Gonzales had prior knowledge of Jessica's numerous psychological disorders. 
Most telling, Mr. Gonzales' attendance at a therapy session with Jessica and his pro se 
motion prior to defense counsel's appointment verify his knowledge. R. 46, 257-58. i 
Having essentially lived together Jessica and her mother as a family for several months, he 
witnessed Jessica's jealousy, hatred, habitual lying, and criminal behavior. R. 257-58. 
After defense counsel was appointed, counsel's "independent investigation" confirmed 
Jessica's two or three stays at a psychiatric hospital "due to psychotic disorders", 
i 
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"antisocial behavior", "repeated history of being dishonest", "serious depression" and 
"paranoid" thoughts. R. 192-93,257-58,460: 12-14, 18,21. As these facts demonstrate, 
Judge McCleve clearly erred in concluding that defense counsel's knowledge of Jessica's 
severe psychological disorders came "directly" from the UUNI records. R. 262; see 
Benevnuto, 1999 UT 60, ^[13, 983 P.2d 556; R. 262. 
Jessica's numerous other psychological disturbances established a "reasonable 
certainty" that the UUNI records contained exculpatory evidence which undermined 
Jessica's veracity and ability to perceive reality. Blake, 2002 UT 113, ^|19, 63 P.3d 56. 
Both Mr. Gonzales' personal knowledge and defense counsel's independent investigation 
constituted "extrinsic indications] that the evidence within the records exists and will, in 
fact, be exculpatory." Id Mr. Gonzales', Beth's, and LaToya's agreement that Jessica 
had falsely accused Mr. Gonzales of touching her on a previous occasion further support 
in camera review under Cardall. 1999 UT 51,1J34, 982 P.2d 79. 
The trial court record also fails to support Judge McCleve's conclusion that the 
defense merely speculated that the UUNI records contained impeachment evidence. R. 
263, 460: 18. Far more than speculation, the facts provided "extrinsic evidence of some 
disorder that might lead to uncertainty regarding [Jessica's] trustworthiness." Blake, 2002 
UT 113, TJ22, 63 P.3d 56. Despite Blake's dicta doubting whether "impeachment 
evidence" would justify in camera review, Jessica's disturbed condition was far more than 
mere impeachment material. 2002 UT 113, [^19 n.2, 63 P.3d 56. In any event, the United 
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States Supreme Court has ruled that "impeachment evidence" supporting acquittal is 
"exculpatory" under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), and must be given to the ^ 
defense. Kvles v. Whitley. 514 U.S. 419, 505 (1995). 
It is well-settled that "[t]he use of a witness's mental condition for impeachment . 
purposes is proper if there is an indication that the mental condition affected [1] the truth 
of his [or her] testimony" or "[2] the witness's ability to observe and relate matters to 
i 
which he [or she] testifies." State v. Dumaine. 783 P.2d 1184, 1198 (Ariz. 1989). 
Jessica's psychosis, antisocial behavior, paranoia, and other impairments directly 
supported Mr. Gonzales' defenses of fabrication and misperception. Because Jessica "has ^ 
a history of mental illness relevant to [her] ability to accurately report on the assault", in 
camera review was required Blake, 2002 UT 113, f21, 63 P.3d 56. This Court can 
resolve any questions about the UUNI records by reviewing them in camera. 
D. Judge McCleve's Erroneous Findings of Facts 
and Conclusions Deprived Mr. Gonzales of His ( 
Right to Choose His Counsel 
Judge McCleve's misapplication of the law and unfounded finding of a conflict 
deprived Mr. Gonzales of his right to choose his counsel. Initially, the State mistakenly < 
complains that Defense counsel invited this error. To the contrary, Judge McCleve gave 
defense counsel no other option under the Rules of Professional Conduct but to withdraw. 
The right to choose one's counsel bars interference with and provides a right to retain an 
existing relationship with appointed counsel. Because defense counsel had no conflict 
i 
20 
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with Mr. Gonzales, Judge McCleve unconstitutionally interfered with the right to counsel. 
1. Defense Counsel Did Not Waive 
Mr. Gonzales' Right to Choose 
His Counsel Because Judge 
McCleve's Decision Ethically 
Required Him to Withdraw 
The State mischaracterizes the record when it asserts that defense counsel 
"affirmatively waived any claim about his removal" by withdrawing from the case. SB at 
42. To the contrary, Judge McCleve forced defense counsel to remove himself by 
baselessly informing defense counsel that "apparently you can't be trusted." R. 460: 18. 
Similarly, in her written ruling on access to the treatment records, Judge McCleve 
concluded that "counsel appears to have created a conflict that calls into question the 
professional ethics of his continued representation of the defendant." R. 266. 
Judge McCleve's doubts about defense counsel's "ethics" required counsel to 
remove himself under the Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 1.16 mandates that a 
"lawyer shall not represent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall 
withdraw from the representation of a client, if: The representation will result in violation 
of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.. . ." Judge McCleve's false 
conclusion that defense counsel had misrepresented that Jessica's mental state was at issue 
required withdrawal under Rule 4.1. That rule prohibits lawyers from making "a false 
statement of material fact to a third person " Utah R. Prof. Cond. 4.1(a). 
Similarly, Rule 1.7 forbids lawyers from representing "a client if the representation 
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of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to . . . a third 
person or by the lawyer's own interest. . . ." Utah R. Prof. Cond. 1.7(b). Judge ' 
McCleve's doubts about defense counsel's conduct undermined her confidence in him, 
thereby calling into question counsel's ability "to represent the interests of [his] client | 
with zeal and loyalty." State v. Holland. 876 P.2d 357. 359 (Utah 1994). The judge's 
comments also jeopardized counsel's standing before the state bar association. Because, 
i 
these competing interests "materially limited" defense counsel's ability to represent Mr. 
Gonzales, Rule 1.7(b) barred defense counsel from representing Mr. Gonzales. 
Moreover, the context surrounding defense counsel's statement that "to a large * 
extent I agree with" Judge McCleve's findings of misconduct shows that no waiver 
occurred here. A party waives the opportunity to raise an issue on appeal when defense 
counsel "consciously chose not to object... and then affirmatively" represented the 
correctness of the trial court's decision. State v. Anderson. 929 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 
1996). Counsel's statement did not "affirmatively" lead Judge McCleve to err because he 
expressed his partial agreement after the judge had already concluded that counsel 
intentionally skirted the law. Prior to defense counsel's partial agreement, he vigorously * 
defended his actions in his written motions and statements in court. In contrast to defense 
counsel's objections, waiver requires "a consciously chosen strategy of trial counsel rather 
than an oversight." State v. Bullock. 791 P.2d 155, 158-59 (Utah 1989). Defense counsel 
could not have "consciously" led Judge McCleve to error when the judge's own false 
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conclusions compelled him to withdraw. Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1109. 
This case is similar to State v. Griffin. 754 P.2d 965, 967 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), in 
which defense counsel filed a pretrial motion to suppress and repeatedly objected to the 
admission of an interview transcript. At trial, following an off-the-record discussion, 
defense counsel stated that the prosecutor had agreed to amend the transcript during the 
lunch recess. Id Defense counsel later stipulated to the admission of the amended 
transcript, h i The Court of Appeals cited this Court's ruling in State v. Johnson, 748 
P.2d 1069, 1071 (Utah 1987), that parties need not renew pretrial motions at trial when 
the same trial judge presided at the motion hearing. The Court then found no waiver 
based on Johnson together with the "defendant's initial objection and his continued 
assertion" of the inadmissibility of the transcript. Griffin, 754 P.2d at 968. Similarly, 
Judge McCleve presided at all relevant proceedings here, defense counsel argued that he 
had not fraudulently obtain the treatment records, and he maintained his arguments in his 
written motions. As in Griffin, no waiver occurred under these circumstances. 
2. The Right to Choose Counsel 
Includes the Right to Preserve 
Existing Relationships With 
Appointed Counsel 
The State also misconstrues the right to choose one's counsel. Although indigent 
defendants have no right to have the trial court appoint defendant's counsel of choice, the 
right to choose one's counsel encompasses the right to "preserve" an existing relationship 
with appointed counsel, State v. Huskev. 82 S.W.3d 297, 305 (Term. Crim. App. 2002): 
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[T]he attorney-client relationship... involves not just the casual 
assistance of a member of the bar, but an intimate process of 
consultation and planning which culminates in a state of trust 
and confidence between the client and his [or herjattorney. This 
is particularly essential, of course, when the attorney is 
defending the client's life or liberty. Furthermore, the 
relationship is independent of the source of compensation, for an 4 
attorney's responsibility is to the person he has undertaken to 
represent rather than to the individual or agency which pays for 
the service. It follows that once counsel is appointed to represent 
an indigent defendant, whether it be the public defender or a 
volunteer private attorney, the parties enter into an attorney- i 
client relationship which is no less inviolable than if counsel had 
been retained. To hold otherwise would be to subject that 
relationship to an unwarranted and invidious discrimination 
arising merely from the poverty of the accused. 
Smith v. Superior Court, 440 P.2d 65, 74 (Cal. 1968) (internal citations omitted); see also 
Commonwealth v. Jordan. 733 N.E.2d 147, 152 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000); People v. Alvin . 
547 N.W.2d 65, 69 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996). 
This Court's decision in Arguelles fully supports this reasoning. Arguelles 
protested that the trial court had deprived him of his right to choose counsel when it i 
removed his appointed attorney with whom he "had established a relationship of trust." 
2003 UT 3, |86, 63 P.3d 731. Although this Court ruled that appointed counsel had a 
conflict of interest that precluded representation, this Court reviewed the merits of 
defendant's claim to keep his appointed counsel. IcL_ at f ^|86, 91. This Court's 
recognition of the defendant's argument is entirely consistent with and recognizes a right 
to preserve relationships with appointed counsel of choice. 
• > i 
24 
A 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3. Judge McCleve Erroneously 
Concluded That Defense 
Counsel's Knowledge of the 
Treatment Records Created a 
Conflict of Interest 
Judge McCleve had no grounds for removing defense counsel in violation of Mr. 
Gonzales' right to preserve his appointed lawyer's representation. Judge McCleve clearly 
erred in finding that defense counsel had a conflict that required his withdrawal. 
Gamblin. 2000 UT 44, [^17 n.2, 1 P.3d 1108. The only conflict that existed was the one 
created by Judge McCleve's erroneous view of the law and defense counsel's conduct. 
Judge McCleve simply adopted the prosecutor's unfounded assumption that defense 
counsel fraudulently obtained the treatment records in violation of law. " A defendant in a 
criminal case may not be denied his [or her] constitutional right to counsel of his [or her] 
choice on the basis of a totally unsupported 'belief by the government that counsel has a 
conflict of interest." United States v. Reese, 699 F.2d 803. 805 (6th Cir. 1983V 
Defense counsel's obtaining of the treatment records and his review of them were 
entirely consistent with Mr. Gonzales' interests. Counsel need only withdraw when 
counsel has "conflicting interests" with the client. People v. Newell, 481 N.E.2d 1238, 
1243 (111. App. Ct. 1985). But, obtaining potentially exculpatory documents for a client's 
defense does not constitute "inconsistent obligations." IdL. If anything, defense counsel's 
knowledge of Jessica's psychotic condition and habitual lying enhanced his confidence in 
and understanding of Mr. Gonzales' claims of innocence. 
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This case is similar to Newman v. State, 2003 Md. App. LEXIS 168, in which the 
defendant sought to disqualify the prosecuting agency because the prosecution had partly ' 
built its case on facts learned from the defendant's privileged attorney-client records. IcL_ 
at 6-7. The Maryland court held that even if the prosecutor had reviewed privileged \ 
material, "the proper remedy would be to bar use of the material at trial, not to disqualify 
the State's Attorney's office." Id. at 20. The court likened the prosecutor's knowledge to 
K 
facts gleaned from an illegally obtained confession. Ll_ Even though the prosecution 
"gained insight. . . that it would otherwise not have had" from the confession, that 
knowledge did not require disqualification. Id_ ^ 
This reasoning applies equally to defense counsel's knowledge of Jessica's 
treatment records. Any knowledge improperly gained from the records can be excluded 
just like any other forms of evidence, such as a complainant's prior sexual history or 
criminal activities, that would be barred by the Rules of Evidence. See, e.g. Utah R. 
i 
Evid. 404(b) (prior bad act evidence); Utah R. Evid. 412 (prior sexual history). Judge 
McCleve's denial of Mr. Gonzales' right to retain appointed counsel requires reversal as a 
matter of law. United State v. Santos, 201 F.3d 953, 960 (7th Cir. 2000). ^ < 
II. DEFENSE COUNSEL PRESERVED AND SUPPORTED 
MR. GONZALES' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO 
CROSS-EXAMINE JESSICA AND ANJALI ABOUT 
THEIR MOTIVES TO LIE. 
The State omits the parties' essential arguments in asserting that Mr. Gonzales5 
subsequent trial counsel failed to preserve his right to cross-examination. Like defense \ 
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counsel's partial agreement with Judge McCleve's ruling, trial counsel's reference to Rule 
of Evidence 609 came after the trial judge had already misconstrued the law and 
erroneously barred essential cross-examination. Trial counsel's repeated, specific, and 
correct explanation of the right to cross-examination afforded the trial judge multiple 
opportunities to correctly decide the issues. The context of trial counsel's statements 
shows that she did not waive this issue for appeal.2 
The State needlessly raises the failure to preserve an argument under Rule of 
Evidence 608(c). SB at 46-53. Trial counsel specifically requested cross-examination 
based on the "sixth amendment" "right to cross-examine" witnesses about "possible bias, 
of the witness; credibility issues and any prejudice [they] may have by testifying against 
the defendant." R. 464: 150-54; 465: 158-59. In support, trial counsel repeatedly cited 
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 0974). R. 465: 159. 
Because trial counsel "'distinctly stated'" her grounds supporting her 
Confrontation Clause claims, she preserved her challenges for appeal. State v. Cantu, 750 
P.2d 591, 594 (Utah 1988). Mr. Gonzales' single citation in his appellate brief to Rule of 
Evidence 608(c) does not defeat preservation. AB at 39. That citation merely supported 
his claimed constitutional right. The State's discussion of Rule 608(c) is irrelevant. 
The record further shows that trial counsel correctly explained the law and in no 
2This brief summarizes the arguments on the right to cross-examination and 
includes the transcript of the relevant proceedings in the Addendum. 
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way led the trial judge into error. Counsel correctly explained that Davis established a 
"right to cross-examine a juvenile offender who has been convicted of an offense, * 
especially one of dishonesty, as I said for impeachment purposes." R. 464: 150. In 
response, the trial judge conceded, "I don't know if I understand" the law on this subject. 
R. 464: 151. The prosecutor tried to educate the judge by accurately explaining that the 
convictions here for retail theft were not admissible under Rule of Evidence 609 because 
( 
they did not involve honesty as required under the rule. R. 464: 151-52; s_ee_ Utah R. 
Evid. 609; State v. Brown. 771 P.2d 1093, 1094 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Trial counsel clarified her argument by stating that "Davis doesn't limit * 
impeachment with only crimes of dishonesty. It covers all crimes, not just those of 
dishonesty." R. 464: 152. When the prosecutor reasserted her reliance on Rule 609, the 
trial judge abruptly concluded "609, then, is our operative rule." R. 464: 152-53. Despite 
his conclusion, the trial judge offered to read Davis during the overnight recess to 
i 
determine if that case contains "a constitutional underpinning [] that constitutionally 
allows you to ask the question of any juvenile adjudication... ." R. 464: 153. 
The next morning, trial counsel repeated her argument that Davis provided a right i 
to cross-examine witnesses about "possible bias, of the witness; credibility issues and any 
prejudice [they] may have by testifying against the defendant", including a witness's 
probation status. R. 465:159. When the trial judge asked trial counsel if she was 
"referring to 609", she responded, "Yes. Thank you." R. 465: 159. The trial judge 
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immediately denied trial counsel's motion because trial counsel had requested "a 
modification of the general rule" under Rule 609. R. 465: 160. The trial judge concluded 
that Rule 609 controlled over Davis and that parties could only impeach witnesses, 
including juveniles, with evidence of "a felony or a crime of dishonesty." R. 465: 160-
61. The trial judge distinguished Davis as applying only to "the relevance of a prior 
criminal situation in the context of the facts of a particular case. . . . " IcL at 160. 
Following the judge's ruling, trial counsel requested "the benefit of the record for 
purposes of appeal, if there is one?" Id. at 161. The trial judge denied the request and 
instructed counsel to present her arguments "to the Court of Appeals." IdL. When trial 
counsel renewed her request to "preserve" her objections, the trial judge concluded that 
"the record is clear" and that trial counsel had adequately "preserved" her objections. IdL 
As these proceedings show, trial defense did not lead the trial judge to error. 
Rather, trial counsel identified the applicable law, corrected the prosecutor's and the trial 
judge's misunderstanding that Rule 609 limited Davis, and explicitly stated that Davis 
"covers all crimes, not just those of dishonesty." R. 464: 152. Given trial counsel's sole 
reliance on the right to confrontation throughout the discussions, she appears to have 
either misspoken or misunderstood when she agreed with the trial judge's reference to 
Rule 609. R. 465: 159. In support, trial counsel arguments immediately preceding this 
comment address Davis and the constitutional right to cross-examine witnesses about bias 
or motive. R. 465: 158-59. Trial defense's slip up was, at most, an "oversight" rather 
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i 
than "a consciously chosen strategy" which invited error. Bullock, 791 P.2d at 158-59. 
The context of trial counsel's statements show she did not mislead the judge, but, ' 
rather, the trial judge failed to comprehend trial counsel's correct legal analysis of Davis . 
Upon initially hearing trial counsel's arguments, the trial judge stated himself that he did . 
not "understand" the law. R. 464: 151. He then erroneously concluded that Rule 609 was 
"operative." IdL at 153. The trial judge's immediate rejection of trial counsel's argument 
( 
the next day establishes that he had already made up his mind that Rule 609 controlled 
and the his reading of Davis did not change his mind. R. 464: 152-53; R. 465: 160. 
The trial judge erred and misread Davis. That case clearly holds that the right to * 
cross-examination supercedes the limits in Rule 609: 
The introduction of evidence of a prior crime is thus a general 
attack on the credibility of the witness. A more particular attack 
on the witness' credibility is effected by means of cross-
examination directed toward revealing possible biases, 
prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness as they may relate 
directly to issues or personalities in the case at hand. The j 
partiality of a witness is subject to exploration at trial, and is 
"always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the 
weight of his testimony." 3 A J. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 940, p. 
775 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). We have recognized that the 
exposure of a witness1 motivation in testifying is a proper and ^ 
important function of the constitutionally protected right of 
cross-examination. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 
(1959). 
Davis v. Alaska. 415 U.S. 308. 316-317 (1974V l 
Because the trial judge misunderstood the law when he asked trial counsel about 
Rule 609, trial counsel's mistaken agreement had no effect on the trial judge's decision. J 
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Counsel's consistent reliance on Davis and her attempts to correct the trial judge's 
understanding sufficiently preserved her arguments. No waiver occurs when the same 
trial judge addresses a disputed issue, counsel initially objects, and then maintains the 
objection throughout the discussion of the issue. Griffin, 754 P.2d at 968. Trial counsel 
did not "consciously" or "affirmatively" lead the trial court to err. Anderson, 929 P.2d at 
1109. In any event, trial counsel's specific arguments coupled with the judge's misreading 
of Davis despite an overnight recess fully satisfied the preservation rule's requirement to 
provide the trial judge an "opportunity" to correctly decide the issue. State v. Cram, 2002 
UT 37410, 46 P.3d 230. 
Even had trial counsel not preserved her arguments, the trial judge's refusal to 
afford trial counsel an opportunity to place her objections on the record excused any 
waiver. This Court recently reiterated that trial judges may not "'act so abruptly . . . that 
defendant's counsel had no opportunity to object.'" State v. Cram, 2002 UT 37, TJ12, 46 
P.3d 230 (quoting State v. Ambrose. 598 P.2d 354, 360 (Utah 1979)). The trial judge's 
refusal to allow trial counsel to place additional arguments on the record and to clarify her 
objection, likewise, denied her an "opportunity" to fully preserve her arguments. Id. 
The trial judge's denial of Mr. Gonzales' right to cross-examine Jessica and Anjali 
about their juvenile records and their "current" custody status undermines the jury's 
verdict. State v. Chavez. 2002 UT App 9,1J20, 41 P.3d 1137. The State's conclusory 
argument that Mr. Gonzales can only speculate about Jessica's and Anjali's biases 
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overlooks that Mr. Gonzales need only show "p ossible biases, prejudices, or ulterior 
motives." Davis, 415 U.S. at 316. As explained in the opening brief, Jessica and Anjali 
had numerous motives to lie and their testimony was pivotal in this close credibility 
contest. AB at 41-42. This evidence prevents any showing of harmlessness beyond a 
reasonable doubt. State v. Hackford. 737 P.2d 200, 204 (Utah 1987). 
III. THE PROSECUTOR WAIVED THE ADMISSIBILITY OF 
JESSICA'S PRIOR ALLEGATIONS AS PRIOR BAD 
ACTS AND COMPLICATED THIS COURT'S REVIEW 
BY FAILING TO FOLLOW THE TRIAL JUDGE'S 
INSTRUCTIONS TO RENEW HER ARGUMENTS 
DURING TRIAL. 
The State does not contest that trial counsel opened the door to Jessica's prior 
allegations. State's Brief at 57-59. Rather, the State asserts that trial counsel's error did 
not prejudice Mr. Gonzales because Jessica's allegations of prior sexual acts were 
admissible under Rule of Evidence 404(b). SB at 61-64. But, the failure to renew an 
objection when the trial court directs waives objections on appeal: 
[W]hen a court properly defers ruling on an issue that has 
been raised and plainly instructs the objecting party to re-raise 
the issue at a specific later time if its objection remains, the 
f
'court[] [is] not [then] required to constantly survey or second-
guess [that] party's best interests or trial strategy." [State v.] 
Labrum, 925 P.2d [937,] 939 [(Utah 1996)]. Rather, the 
requirement of a timely objection to preserve the issue for review 
is renewed under the terms set forth by the trial court. In essence, 
if no such later objection is made, the party has not "presented 
[the issue] to the trial court in a manner sufficient to obtain a 
ruling thereon," thereby preserving the issue for review. Buehner 
[Block Co. v. UWC Assocs.]. 752 P.2d [892,] 894 n.2 [(Utah 
1988)]. 
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State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 114, 1J16, 61 P.3d 1062. This ruling applies to all parties. IcL_ 
The trial judge below specifically instructed the parties to renew their arguments 
about prior bad acts because he could not adequately determine the admissibility of 
Jessica's allegations until the State presented its evidence. R. 464: 15-16. Despite this 
directive, the prosecutor did not renew her arguments under Rule 404(b). Instead, she 
only argued that trial counsel opened the door to the admissibility of Jessica's prior 
allegations. R. 466: 484. The failure to renew the objection "under the terms set forth by 
the trial court" bars appellate review. Hansen, 2002 UT 114,1J16, 61 P.3d 1062. 
Moreover, the prosecutor's failure to renew her arguments, presents this Court with 
a difficult task. Even if Jessica's allegations supported criminal intent, this Court has 
cautioned trial judges about prior bad acts' "powerful tendency to mislead the finder of 
fact." State v.Saunders, 1999 UT 59, f 15, 992 P.2d 951. Moreover, "[i]t is fundamental 
to our law that a person may be convicted criminally only for his acts, not for his general 
character . . . or propensity to commit bad acts." Id, Given the prejudicial effect of prior 
bad acts, "admission of prior crimes evidence itself must be scrupulously examined by 
trial judges." IdL at Tjl 8. The prosecutor's failure to preserve her arguments deprives this 
Court of a scrupulous examination to review. Instead, the State merely speculates that the 
trial judge "would have likely" admitted the evidence. SB at 61. This Court should reject 
the State's claim on appeal. 
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IV. BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE OF CHILD SUPPORT 
ARREARS WAS IRRELEVANT TO ESTABLISHING AN 
ISSUE OF ANY CONSEQUENCE, TRIAL COUNSEL * 
WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR WITHDRAWING HER 
OBJECTION TO THE ADMISSION OF THIS EVIDENCE. 
Contrary to the State's attempts to distinguish State v. LeVasseur, 854 P.2d 1022 ^ 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993), and State v. Martinez. 848 P.2d 702, 705 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), the 
rationale of those cases supports excluding evidence of Mr. Gonzales' child support 
arrears. SB at 65. Those cases upheld the exclusion of specific acts of misconduct 
because the proposed evidence was not '"relevant for some purpose other than 
contradicting testimonies. . . .'" Martinez, 848 P.2d at 705; (quoting United States v. ' 
Phillips, 888 F.2d 38, 41 (6th Cir. 1989)). Stated differently, the proposed evidence 
"interjected an irrelevant issue." IdL; LeVasseur, 854 P.2d at 1024. 
The child support arrears similarly raised an "irrelevant" issue. AB at 47. Utah 
Rule of Evidence 402 precludes the admission of evidence "which is not relevant. . . . " 
Rule of Evidence 401 defines relevant evidence as "having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." In violation of this rule, 
Mr. Gonzales' arrears addressed no "fact that [wa]s of consequence" to this case. Utah R. 
Evid. 401. The evidence simply served to label Mr. Gonzales a generally bad person. For 
this reason, "[e]vidence of a witness's failure to pay his [or her] debts . . . is not probative 
on the issue of truthfulness." United States v. Pedraza, 27 F.3dl515, 1529 (10th Cir. 
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1994) (citing United States v. Lanza. 790 F.2d 1015, 1020 (2nd Cir. 1986)). The arrears 
were immaterial. Whitley v. State, 265 So. 2d 99, 101 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); State v. 
Costner, 343 S.E.2d 241, 245 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986). 
Further contrary to the State's claims, "invit[ing]M cross-examination does not 
change irrelevant evidence into relevant evidence. SB at 65. Courts exclude evidence of 
the failure to pay debts, including child support arrears, because that evidence lacks 
"relevance." Lanza, 790 F.2d at 1020; see also Ad-Vantage Tel. Directory Consultants, 
Inc. v. GTE Directories Corp., 37 F.3d 1460, 1464 (11th Cir. 1994); Pedraza, 27 F.3d at 
1529; Whitley, 265 So. 2d at 101. Mr. Gonzales' arrears did not "make the existence of 
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence." Utah R. Evid. 401. That evidence was, 
therefore, inadmissible under Rule 402. 
Even if the arrears had some relevance, the probative value of that evidence was 
"substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury. . . ." Utah R. Evid. 403. Evidence that is only "marginally relevant" 
violates Rule 403 because "'the danger [is] great that the jury would infer more from" the 
evidence than it fairly should. United States v. Novaton, 271 F.3d 968, 1006 (11th Cir. 
2001) (quoting Ad-Vantage, 37 F.3d at 1464). Here, the child support arrears raised an 
entirely collateral issue that focused the jury's attention on Mr. Gonzales being a dead-
beat father. State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291,295-96 (Utah 1988). His failure to pay child 
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f 
support added no insight on the veracity of Jessica's allegations. Accordingly, the 
evidence was not admissible under Rule 403. Novaton
 m 271 F.3d at 1006. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Gonzales requests this Court to reverse his convictions, remand this matter for ^ 
a new trial, re-appoint defense counsel, and order the trial court to conduct an in camera 
review of the psychological records. 
( 
Dated this \^_ day of March, 2004. 
KENT R. HART 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
( 
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1 This argument also applies to Jessica Safford's 
2 testimony that I anticipate the State's going to bring out. 
3 There is a police report in which the officer alluded to the 
4 statement that Anjali --
5 I'm sorry. What is her last name? 
6 MS. COOK: Kulkarni. 
7 MS. MILLER: If I can just call her Anjali. 
8 THE COURT: Anjali Kulkarni is the name of the 
9 witness, 
10 MS. MILLER: Right, your Honor. She's a juvenile. 
11 THE COURT: And Ms. Safford also is included in this? 
12 MS. MILLER: Yes. I just want to make the court 
13 aware and the State aware that these are --of course these are 
14 juveniles. There is a statement in the police report which 
15 talks about Anjali1s statement to the police where she states 
16 Jessica is very reliable, she never lies, she always tells the 
17 truth. Both those girls have a juvenile conviction of retail 
18 theft, is my understanding. And Davis versus Alaska, a 1974 
19 U.S. Supreme Court case states for impeachment purposes a 
20 defense attorney has the right to cross-examine a juvenile 
21 offender who has been convicted of an offence, especially one 
22 of dishonesty, as I said, for impeachment purposes. 
23 So, in fact, if she states I always tell the truth 
24 or Jessica states I always tell the truth, I never lie, it's 
25 proper under Davis versus Alaska for me to impeach them about 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 their juvenile conviction, at least ask them about it. And I 
2 wanted -- you know, I didn't want to go ahead and ask about 
3 that without making the Court aware that that was my intention 
4 and making the State aware that that was my intention, and 
5 giving you the opportunity to read the case law. I'm sure 
6 you're familiar with it, and the State as well. 
7 THE COURT: So your request is, then, to make a 
8 determination if those witnesses testify and if they indicate 
9 that their testimony is truthful -- I'm not quite -- • 
10 MS. MILLER: If they say --
11 THE COURT: I don't know if I understand it. 
12 MS. MILLER: If either one of them gets on the stand 
13 and says I always tell the truth, I never lie, I never lied 
14 before, it's proper to impeach them with testimony that they 
15 have committed a crime of dishonesty. 
16 THE COURT: And again the matter is in juvenile 
17 court. 
18 MS. MILLER: Each of them was convicted of the retail 
19 theft, your Honor. It was prior -- sometime between January of 
20 2001 and this incident. 
21 THE COURT: The State's position? 
22 MS. ANDRUZZI: Thank you, your Honor. 
23 Although Ms. Miller is correct in stating that we 
24 can certainly use juvenile convictions, they have to be the 
25 same kind of convictions that we use in adult proceedings. In 
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1 other words, a felony or a misdemeanor involving dishonesty. 
2 State v. Brown in the annotated code specifically excludes 
3 theft from a crime of dishonesty. So theft is -- a misdemeanor 
4 theft is not a crime of dishonesty according to the Utah 
5 Supreme Court, so she would not be allowed inquire into that. 
6 Second of all, it would an improper question for us 
7 to ask one witness to bolster the credibility of another. All 
8 we can do is inquire as to a person's reputation in the 
9 community for truth an veracity, and certainly we would be 
10 entitled to do that if we a can lay the proper foundation. But 
11 we canft ask the witness do you always tell the truth, and we 
12 don't have any intention of asking beyond the Rules of 
13 Evidence. 
14 THE COURT: Well, that -- if you want --
15 MS. MILLER: I would just say, your Honor, Davis 
16 doesn't limit impeachment with only crimes of dishonesty. It 
17 covers all crimes, not just those of dishonesty. 
18 MS. ANDRUZZI: But 609 does, your Honor. It doesn't 
19 limit -- whether juveniles or adults, we still have the Rules 
20 of Evidence and we still have to abide by them. 
21 THE COURT: Well, I suppose we have two things to 
22 consider here. One can impeach the testimony of any witness --
23 609 would be our operative rule. 404 I think is just for 
24 defendcint. 609? 
25 MS. ANDRUZZI: 609 is impeachment by evidence and 
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conviction of a crime. 
THE COURT: 609, then, is our operative rule. And I 
believe the parameters of that are that on any witness you can 
inquire about a felony conviction within a ten-year period or a 
crime in the same period, a crime involving dishonesty. Maybe 
I need to look at that opinion again in terms of the supreme 
court decision, but it would seem to me that unless that 
decision would indicate that your ability to inquire into any 
offense for which there has been an adjudication in the 
juvenile court, and that was based on a constitutional 
underpinning, then the rule would apply and that would limit it 
to crimes involving dishonesty, of which retail left is not 
one. 
So I suppose I could look at that supreme court 
opinion, but as I say, unless there is a constitutional 
underpinning there that constitutionally allows you to ask the 
question of any juvenile adjudication, then I don't think you 
can inquire into it. However, there may be other basis that 
would permit that to be inquired into. To the extent that 
unless there's another basis to inquire into it -- and I think 
the proper procedure would be before the question is asked that 
we explore the other bases prior to asking the question -- then 
I don't think you are permitted to ask the question of either 
of these witnesses that have been identified. 
MS. MILLER: Your Honor, may I give you the citation 
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1 
1 of that? 
2 THE COURT: Yes. 
3 MS. MILLER: I believe it's -- and again I can't find 
4 my notes, but I'm pretty sure it's 415 U.S. 308. That's a 1974 
5 case, and the decision is based on the sixth amendment 
6 confrontation clause. It states that the right to confront 
7 witnesses against you is paramount to the interest of keeping 
8 the juvenile record anonymous. And that's the basis of that 
9 holding. 
10 THE COURT: Let's do this. As I say, that seems to 
11 be -- I don't have a copy of that at hand here. Let's do this. 
12 Why don't we have you come here at 8:30 and that will give us 
13 an opportunity -- also an opportunity to review this opinion, 
14 and then I can hear sort of a brief further argument and then 
15 make a finding, a conclusion. As I say, at this point it seems 
16 to me that that somehow trumps the Rule 609 if you're 
17 restricted to the rule, but let me read it and hear further 
18 argument about it. And let's do that at 8:30 in the morning. 
19 MS. MILLER: Okay. 
20 Is there anything further to consider? 
21 MS. MILLER: No. ' 
22 THE COURT: We'll be in recess until 8:30. 
23 (Evening recess taken.) 
24 
25 
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Salt Lake City, Utah; Thursday, August 22, 2002; a.m. 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
(The following proceedings were held in open court 
out of the presence of the jury. Present were the 
Defendant with Ms. Miller; Ms. Cook and Ms. Andruzzi 
for the State.) 
THE COURT: Good morning. We're here in matter of 
the State of Utah versus Arthur Anthony Gonzales. 
It appears to me the attorneys and Mr. Gonzales are 
here. The jury has not been brought in yet. There was a 
matter we ended yesterday with and it was, Ms. Miller, 
your motion in limine regarding the questioning of two 
juveniles who will be appearing in this trial as witnesses, and 
you wish to inquire of their prior juvenile record, and that 
referred us to Davis versus Alaska Supreme Court -- United 
States Supreme Court opinion, and I had occasion to read that. 
Let me give you a couple of minutes here if you want 
to add anything to the argument you already made. 
MS. MILLER: All I would add, your Honor, is that 
Davis versus Alaska supports the proposition that in state 
cases as well it is appropriate on cross-examination, because 
of the very important sixth amendment right to cross-examine 
and confront the witnesses against you, that I would be 
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1 entitled on cross-examination only to establish bias, possible 
2 bias, of the witness; credibility issues and any prejudices she 
3 may have by testifying against the defendant. 
4 For instance, I think the case allows me to ask if 
5 she is on juvenile probation, if she has been convicted of a 
6 juvenile offense. And I don't think the door has to be opened 
7 by the prosecution in order for me to do that. To have an 
8 effective confrontation under the sixth amendment, that's what 
9 that case allows. That's what our own rule allows. 
10 THE COURT: Are your referring to 609? 
11 MS. MILLER: Yes. Thank you. 
12 THE COURT: I appreciate your position, Ms. Miller. 
13 I respectfully disagree. My reading of that -- before I 
14 started to read it, I started to recall -- I don't know if 
15 there is another opinion --in terms of juvenile adjudications 
16 they're really not convictions; they're adjudications. 
17 MS. MILLER: That's right. 
18 THE COURT: Whether we want to get into that pursuant 
19 to Rule 609, I don't know what that opinion is, but it is not 
20 Davis versus Alaska because that stands for, if you will, 
21 that -- which would be true with any matter. And that is if 
22 someone's prior record, given the facts of the particular case, 
23 make it relevant in terms of confronting them regarding motive, 
24 bias, motive on law and so forth and bias -- well, motive to 
25 lie is really what it is in a particular case, then one can 
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1 inquire into that. And the issue in Davis was whether, given 
2 the State's interest to keep juvenile records private, if you 
3 will, and the embarrassment to the juvenile regarding their 
4 record, whether you could inquire into that. And one could 
5 inquire into this if itfs relevant to the facts of the 
6 particular case. But could you do that with the juvenile? And 
7 the supreme court opinion is, yes, the confrontation clause of 
8 the sixth amendment, trumps, if you will, supersedes, any 
9 interest the State has in keeping juvenile records private and 
10 the embarrassment caused to the juvenile about their prior 
11 record or probationary terms, or whatever it might be. But 
12 that is particular to the case. That was relevant in the case. 
13 But what you're seeking here is sort of a modification of the 
14 general rule. 609 is a general rule that applies to all 
15 witnesses regardless of whether their conviction is relevant or 
16 not in the facts of the particular case. A decision has been 
17 made, if you will, that if you have been convicted of a felony 
18 or crime involving dishonesty, that as a general proposition 
19 you can inquire into that. It doesn't have to be relevant. 
20 You have to •-- you don't have to show any relevance in the 
21 facts in the particular case. 
22 So I think what we're dealing with is Davis dealt 
23 with relevance of a prior criminal situation in the context of 
24 the facts of a particular case, and Rule 609 is the general 
25 proposition in terms of what you can inquire into. And in any 
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event, like I say, I think there is an opinion that would give 
us the proposition that you can inquire into a juvenile's prior 
record, vis-a-vis 609, if it complied with 609, and that is 
therefs an adjudication of an offense of the equivalent of 
which was a felony or a crime of dishonesty. But my 
understanding is that these two juveniles don't fit into either 
of those categories. Their offense was not a felony under the 
adult statute, or a crime of dishonesty, being a retail theft. 
Consequently, for those reasons, your motion is 
denied and you may not inquiry pursuant to 609 of these 
juveniles regarding that prior record. 
MS. MILLER: Your Honor, may I just have the benefit 
of the record for purposes of appeal, if there is one? 
THE COURT: Well, you can give your argument to the 
Court of Appeals. 
MS. MILLER: Well, I have to preserve it in the trial 
court. 
THE COURT: You preserved your objection. You made 
your motion. You preserved it. I have given you the reasons 
why and you can write a very lengthy brief to the court of 
appeals in terms of the further argument. I think the record 
is clear. 
Let's call the jury in and begin this trial. 
MS. MILLER: Your Honor, on the record I will need to 
invoke the Exclusionary Rule. Do you want me to do that now or 
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